1	Isaac D. Zorea
2	Law Office of Isaac Derek Zorea
	P.O. Box 210434
3	Anchorage, AK 99521 (907) 677-3779
4	(907) 644-2802 facsimile
5	In The United States District Court
6	FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
7	CAROLYN MITCHELL,
8	Plaintiff,
0	vs.
9)
10	ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT and the) MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, a)
11	municipal corporation, WALTER MONEGAN,)
10	Officer HENIKMAN, and Officer J. VOSS,
12	Defendants.
13	Case No. 3:05-cv-00273-JWS
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15	PLAINTIFF'S OFFICIAL IMMUNITY BRIEFING
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	At the June 25, 2008, pre-trial conference, the court permitted Plaintiff to
17	respond to Defendants' request for a jury instruction concerning Official Immunity.
18	respond to Defendants request for a jury instruction concerning official infinumty.
19	Defendant mistakenly believes that the jury should be instructed on the complex
20	issue of official immunity, and discretionary immunity. Clearly the question
21	concerning whether a municipal official is enacting a discretionary function
22	concerning actions relevant to a tort are legal determinations that only this court car
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24	make, and at this stage of the litigation, can only make if a directed verdict is
25	presented after the plaintiff has presented her case.

As a strictly legal argument, the Defendants have cited to no case law

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wherein a municipal actor's tort of false arrest can be construed as a discretionary function. Unlike the immunity afforded state actors under AS 09.50.250, municipal officers are not permitted the "good faith" defense as laid out in section 1 of that statute: 'an action may not be brought if the claim (1) is an action for tort, and is based upon an act or omission of an employee of the state, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not the statute or regulation is valid." Under the municipal immunity clause, AS 09.65.070(d)(2), immunity is premised on the performance of a "discretionary function." Complying with State statutes is not a discretionary function.

In this case, Voss and Henikman violated Alaska law by (1) arresting Mitchell, (2) without probable cause. The associated torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are all by products of unlawful conduct. It is ridiculous to argue, as the Defendants do, that the natural result of unlawful conduct can be classified as a discretionary act. No municipal official has the discretion to violate the law.

That being said, no case cited by the Defendants establish that the question of immunity is a jury question. The Defendants could not find an Alaska Pattern Civil Jury Instruction of official immunity because such questions are legal questions to be answered by the court. All the cases cited by Defendants are cases that had been decided at the summary judgment level. As this court has already ruled that qualified immunity is not an issue for the jury, it is unfounded for Defendants to expect immunity under state law to become an issue for the jury.

Eyedz@gci.net

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